In this exploratory paper, we investigate whether there are links between institutional context and the development of markets in home equity conversion that are based on financial instruments facilitating mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW). Using secondary data and literature sources from six countries (Australia, UK, USA, Netherlands, Finland and Germany), the paper addresses two research questions. First, to what extent are there differences in the range and use of MEW financial instruments across these six countries? Second, how might the institutional context governing a nation's housing and capital markets support or hinder MEW in these countries? The paper concludes by drawing some implications for debates sparked by housing's changing welfare role as a means of smoothing consumption over the life cycle.
Introduction
The wealth stored in owner-occupied housing has traditionally played an important welfare role in enabling a better match between consumption and income over the life cycle (Castles, 1998; Kemeny, 1981) . In the early years of life cycles, following completion of formal schooling, incomes are typically low, and those households climbing onto the homeownership ladder borrow in order to finance their housing purchases. As household incomes grow, children leave the family home and mortgages are paid off, owner-occupiers enter their retirement years with large imputed rental incomes that help maintain living standards in old age. Releasing housing wealth to advance consumption plans at any stage of the life cycle was seen as a last resort reserved for emergencies, and could only be achieved via cumbersome and costly methods such as trading on, or selling up.
However, financial deregulation since the 1980s and recent mortgage innovation has in some countries spawned a plethora of financial instruments that facilitate in situ mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) by owner-occupiers belonging to any age group. In situ MEW is a relatively new low cost style of housing equity withdrawal (HEW) that allows homeowners to draw down on their housing wealth by adding to their existing mortgages without having to move (also referred to as equity borrowing).
1 MEW products encompass age-specific forms targeted at the elderly, reverse or lifetime mortgages, for example, as well as non-age-specific forms such as flexible mortgages, which all homeowners can access (Munro, 2012) .
These are opportune product developments because structural changes in labour markets have made jobs less secure, and incomes more volatile (see Clapham, 2005 , chapter 3). Moreover, historically high divorce rates have turned biographical disruptions into a common cause of adverse shocks that threaten welfare. Equity borrowing products can offer owner-occupiers a means of buffering unexpected falls in income, or the financial resources to meet acute spending needs at all stages of the life cycle (Ong, Parkinson, Searle, Smith, & Wood, 2013b) .
Despite the appeal of this welfare switching function, the introduction of MEW products, and hence their use, is uneven across Western Industrialised Countries. Our paper attempts to shed light on this irregular pattern by contrasting the market in home equity conversion across six countries À Australia, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, UK and USA.
We employed three specific section criteria in selecting appropriate case study countries that offer diversity in housing finance systems.
2 First, we assume that the homeownership rate in the country has to breach a certain minimum before housing equity becomes prominent enough in wealth portfolios that it prompts owners to consider how it should be drawn down or augmented over the life course. Hence, as shown along the horizontal axis of Figure 1 , all six case study countries have homeownership rates of at least 40% in our study. Second, a relatively well-developed mortgage market is a necessary requirement for MEW to flourish, and this is proxied by the residential mortgage debt to GDP ratio. The higher the ratio, the better developed the mortgage market is likely to be. We have therefore included Australia, the UK and USA as they have relatively high debt to GDP ratios (see Figure 1 ). They are also the key countries in which MEW products were first introduced, and where MEW has been widely used (ASIC, 2005; Ong et al., 2013b) . The Netherlands has an extremely high rate of residential mortgage debt as a proportion of GDP that is in excess of 100%. Hence, it is included as a fourth case study country. The final selection criteria is diversity À in order to distinguish between factors that either facilitate or impede the use of MEW, we ought to include countries where mortgage markets are relatively less developed, but where MEW options do still exist. Hence, Germany and Finland were selected as their less developed mortgage markets add diversity in housing finance systems to the selected set of countries.
3 For these six countries we explore possible links between the institutional features of housing and capital markets and the emergence of MEW products. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the changing nature of housing asset-based welfare from the traditional role of supporting consumption in old age, to flexible equity drawdowns that buffer income shocks and smooth consumption across all stages of the life course. Section 3 documents styles of MEW that are characteristic in each of the six case study countries. This is followed in Section 4 by a comparison of market and institutional features in order to explore possible relationships between these features and styles of MEW across our sample of countries. A final section draws possible links between alternative institutional arrangements and the potential for equity borrowing. It also speculates on implications for the role of housing wealth as an asset base for welfare. The countries that are reviewed in our study have been depicted using black diamonds. Each country satisfies a cut-off rate of at least 40% on each axis for inclusion. The average rate of homeownership (debt to GDP ratio) across the 17 countries in the graph is 68% (67%).
The changing role of homeownership
In their seminal work, Kemeny (1980 Kemeny ( , 1981 and Castles (1998) have proposed a trade-off between the size of a country's owner-occupied sector and that of its welfare state. Kemeny (1981) found that countries with relatively less developed welfare states have high rates of homeownership. Castles (1998) reports an inverse relationship among a suite of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the period 1960À1990. Although the direction of causation is a matter of dispute, the generally accepted implication is that in homeownership societies older, low income outright owners will have negligible housing costs because they are no longer paying off mortgages, and can therefore get by on smaller pensions (Castles, 1998) .
There is some evidence supporting this idea. Australia is a typical homeownership society with very high rates of homeownership since the late 1950s (hovering around 70%). State retirement pensions are means tested and there is a growing emphasis on self-funded retirement. The compulsory superannuation guarantee, introduced in the early 1990s, was one such measure. Ritakallio (2003, p. 81) contrasts Australia with the less ownership oriented Finland and shows 'that, instead of vast differences in inequality, poverty and, in particular, old-age poverty, the real differences between both countries are only modest when housing costs are taken into account'. On comparing six countries, Yates and Bradbury (2010) find that while Australia has the highest before-housing poverty rate among those aged 65 years or over, this same age group has one of the lowest after-housing poverty rates 4 because of older outright owners' low housing costs (see also Heylen & Haffner, 2012) . Delfani, De Deken, and Dewilde (2014, p. 657 ) offers a more nuanced perspective: 'The conclusion of a trade-off between the rate of home-ownership and spending on pensions … is unlikely to hold universally when differences between housing and pension provision across (institutional) contexts are taken into account'. Their research shows that only in countries where both housing and pensions are typically provided through market mechanisms is there evidence of owner occupied housing balancing more parsimonious state retirement pensions.
Homeownership and pensions can be connected with MEW products, typified by reverse mortgages, which are targeted at 'elderly' homeowners. Reverse mortgages allow borrowers to draw on secured loans just like any other mortgage, but repayment is not required until the house is sold. Interest payments are deferred so the outstanding debt balloons over the loan term (Reifner, Clerc-Renaud, P erezCarillo, Tiffe, & Knobloch, 2007a, b) .
In recent times a broader welfare role for owner-occupied housing has emerged. Financial deregulation and mortgage innovation bred a plethora of financial instruments that facilitate in situ equity borrowing. One of the more important innovations was the flexible mortgage À a secured loan that can be repaid in varying instalments, while at the same time allowing the borrower to roll-out their housing equity up to some agreed limit. Flexible mortgages have grown in popularity in countries such as Australia and the UK. Their success was helped along by soaring house prices between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, as well as historically low interest rates. Borrowers are also encouraged by the absence of a costly application process; these products convert housing wealth into a virtual 'ATM' that mortgagors can use to draw down, or add to their housing equity, as and when they choose (Klyuev & Mills, 2010; Smith, Searle, & Cook, 2009) . Flexible mortgages can be accessed at any stage of the life course, though they appeal more to younger borrowers who can 'bank on' an expected stream of earnings to meet repayments.
These different types of equity borrowing products serve both the traditional and new housing asset based welfare roles (Toussaint & Elsinga, 2009 ). Reverse mortgages, for example, appeal to those with large amounts of housing equity but current and future income streams that are insufficient to service a traditional mortgage. They are therefore typically taken out, if at all, late in the life cycle to meet either discretionary or urgent spending needs, and hence support wellbeing in old age. On the other hand, flexible mortgages serve owner occupied housing's new role as a financial resource to be stored or released as needed over the life course. As assets can only be spent once, this new role could compromise the traditional one. The next section describes how different types of MEW have emerged in the six countries under study.
MEW styles À a cross-country review
In this section, we describe age-specific products targeted on seniors over 60 years of age (in particular reverse mortgages), and non-age-specific products such as flexible mortgages. The description is supplemented by trend estimates collected from available secondary sources on the extent of MEW in each country (see Table 1 ). The section concludes by comparing the different styles of MEW that have appeared across the six case study nations.
United States
As far as age-specific products is concerned, reverse mortgages were the first to appear in 1961, and were aimed at older homeowners in 1961 (Wicke, 2008 ; see also Schneider, 2009 ). The USA was one of the first countries (together with the UK) where this kind of mortgage was offered. Today it is the most widely used age-specific equity borrowing product in the market (ASIC, 2005) . Back in 1987 the US Congress passed legislation authorising a Government backed Federal HomeÀEquityÀConversionÀMortgage (HECM) Program (Wicke, 2008; see also Schneider, 2009) . Over 90% of all reverse mortgages are now originated through this initiative (see Bishop & Shan, 2008; Gotman, 2011) . The US government guarantees fulfilment of the reverse mortgage contract if a lending financial institution Very few non-age-specific products exist.
Germany Very few reverse mortgage products exist.
Very few non-age-specific products exist. fails. Outstanding debt is capped at the owner's home value, but lenders are not exposed to negative equity risk as Federal government covers the lender's loss in such circumstances. Despite these government guarantees, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2012) notes that the reverse mortgage market 5 remains very small with a market penetration of only 2%À3% of the homeowner households eligible to take-up reverse mortgages. The origination of HECMs did grow strongly between 2001 and 2007 (Ong, Haffner, Wood, Jefferson, & Austen 2013a) . However, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) appears to have tempered older homeowners' appetite for MEW, with growth in the origination of HECMs slowing during 2007À2009 and slumping between 2009 and 2012 (see Table 1 ).
Alternatives to reverse mortgages include refinancing conventional fixed interest mortgages, and Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs), a flexible mortgage product that allows homeowners to use a line of credit to borrow funds up to some specified credit limit, using the primary home as collateral. These products are nonage-specific, though older homeowners generally find it more difficult to meet eligibility criteria because they require regular interest and principal payments (CFPB, 2012) . However, Do (2012, p. 301) states that HELOCs often carry an interest-only repayment feature with the principal repaid at the end of the loan term. This is potentially more attractive to older borrowers. HELOCs offer flexibility in the timing of repayments and are offered at adjustable rather than fixed interest rates, but Do (2012, p. 301) argues that flexibility is effectively limited by pre-payment penalties or non-usage fees.
United Kingdom
MEW products have been available in the UK for roughly 30 years (ASIC, 2005) and has the most developed housing equity release market in Europe (Reifner et al., 2007b, p. 3) . Reverse mortgages, more commonly known as lifetime mortgages in the UK, constituted the most frequently offered age-specific equity borrowing product in recent decades (Reifner et al. (2007b) . According to the UK's Equity Release Council 6 reverse mortgages have dominated sales in the market for equity products targeted on the elderly, achieving a market share of 98% in 2011. However, the take-up of these age-specific products was significantly higher pre-GFC (The Wriglesworth Consultancy, 2011), as indicated by trend estimates in Table 1 .
Several types of non-age-specific MEW instruments are available. One such product is a second mortgage (Reifner et al., 2007b; Reinold, 2011) . More importantly mortgage providers have also launched flexible mortgage products which are increasingly used by homeowners as a style of in situ equity borrowing that allows housing equity to be rolled out in a relatively costless manner (Klyuev & Mills, 2010) . Indeed mortgage products that allow mortgagors to borrow up at a time of their choice (subject to credit limits) became the most popular MEW product in the UK in the pre-GFC years (Reifner et al., 2007b) . It is common for these flexible mortgages to also offer an offset facility 7 whereby the balance stored in a savings account can be deducted from the outstanding mortgage debt for the purposes of calculating interest payments.
8 Overall, just under one in five British homeowners engaged in MEW annually in the lead up to the GFC (see Table 1 ).
Australia
The reverse mortgage is also targeted on older homeowners in Australia (ASIC, 2005; Bridge, Adams, Phibbs, Mathews, & Kendig, 2011) . But the market for reverse mortgages did not begin until the early 2000s, a relatively late start compared to the UK and USA (Dolan, McLean, & Roland, 2005) . Reverse mortgages are currently supplied by several banks. 9 The reverse mortgage market has grown steadily through the GFC years, in contrast to the UK and USA where market growth in reverse mortgages stalled (see Table 1 ). It seems that older homeowners have retained an appetite for reverse mortgages throughout the GFC. However, there has been a slowdown in the value of reverse mortgage originations (new loans) since the peak of the pre-GFC house price boom in 2006 (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and SEQUAL, 2011).
There is a longer history of non-age-specific MEW products. Flexible mortgages have been marketed by Australian banks since 1986 (Moloney & Bor, 2003) . These allow borrowers to make accelerated repayments, but also permit redraws back up to the original mortgage balance. There is no fee payable when a redraw is made, and no limits on the number of times a redraw can be made. Furthermore, interest rates are in line with those charged on conventional mortgage loan products that have fixed repayment schedules and no redraw facility. Flexible mortgages are increasingly used by homeowners as a style of in situ equity borrowing that allows housing equity to be rolled out in a relatively costless manner (Klyuev & Mills, 2010) . A common flexible mortgage product is the current account mortgage, which offers the redraw and accelerated repayment facilities of a flexible mortgage, but is also a form of offset mortgage as described in the UK case above (Smith, Ford, & Munro, 2002) .
During 2002-07, almost one in five Australian homeowners engaged in MEW annually (see Table 1 ). Findings from Ong et al. (2013a) indicate that younger homeowners are more inclined to equity borrow using these products. The GFC did not precipitate a sharp decline in MEW across all homeowner-borrowers. In fact the trends are mixed. As those above 45 years of age actually increased equity borrowing, it is possible that older owners were more exposed to risks in the post-GFC era, and were therefore forced to unlock housing wealth more often to meet emergencies. 10 On the other hand, as owners under 45 years of age typically reduced their MEW activity, expectations of price declines following the GFC might well have prompted a more conservative management of debt and housing wealth in this age group, who have generally accumulated less housing equity than older cohorts.
The Netherlands
Age-specific products are generally not offered by lenders in the Netherlands (Ong et al., 2013a) . However, in the late 1990s, house price inflation caused a surge in MEW by homeowners in all age groups (Van den End, Kakes, van Rooij, & Stokman, 2002) , as is evident in Table 1 . The share of mortgagors engaging in MEW dipped slightly then recovered a little before the GFC (Ebner, 2013) , but has remained well below borrowing propensities in Australia and the UK.
In the late nineties the surge in MEW was commonly executed by one-off applications to increase the loan balance on an existing mortgage via refinancing or a second mortgage (Toussaint 2013; Van den End et al., 2002) . Ebner (2013) cites figures from Charlier and Von Bussel (2003) , indicating that refinancing accounted for between 18% and 40% of newly issued mortgage debt between 1996 and 2001. However, in due course, as described in Reifner et al. (2007b) , other product offerings appeared in the form of lines of credit secured against a home. They share some of the characteristics of Australian or UK flexible mortgages, such as no prepayment penalties, and in some instances, rates are allowed to change on a monthly basis.
11 Interest payments are charged on drawdowns using the line of credit. These types of mortgage loans are called credit mortgages and do not seem to be very popular (Ministerie van BZK, 2013).
Finland
In Finland, a product similar to a reverse mortgage was introduced at a variable interest rate by the OP-Pohjola Group (comprising 200 cooperative banks) in 2007 (Reifner et al., 2007b) . It is offered to elderly homeowners as a ten-year fixed term loan. After ten (or five) years the contract must be revised and renewed before the loan can continue. The monthly payments to the homeowner are set assuming a loan term that extends over the homeowner's lifetime. The homeowner does not need to make any interest payments during the loan term. These amounts are added to the loan.
Homeflex loans were launched by the Nordea Bank Finland in 2005, though they do not appear to be age-specific in nature.
12 These loans offer a line of credit facility up to a limit of 75% of home value. However, borrowers pay interest over the loan term and the loan principal must be repaid after ten years, unless the loan is refinanced or a longer amortisation period can be negotiated. On the other hand early repayments of principal are permitted at any time without penalty.
Other non-age-specific products such as lines of credit exist, but in the official statistics they are classified as normal consumer loans. The rather limited literature on Finnish MEW suggests a market in home equity conversion that remains relatively undeveloped.
Germany
Germany has, like Finland, very few age or non-age-specific vehicles for MEW. Reifner et al.'s (2007b) comprehensive equity release study signalled the existence of MEW activities. However, these activities have not taken off in Germany. There is no evidence of a significant market presence in flexible mortgages, the re-financing of mortgages or most of the other instruments available in Australia and the UK. The exception is second mortgages, but they have proved unattractive to homeowners (Reifner et al., 2007b) .
A comparison
We have drawn a distinction between mortgages that allow equity withdrawal, but can only be accessed by older homeowners, and vehicles for MEW that are (in principle) available to homeowners in all age groups. Table 1 offers a comparison of the extent of these MEW types across the case study countries. The age-specific mortgage products have remained a small segment of the mortgage market despite an ageing population, and even in the USA where products have been offered with government backing. The most prevalent age-specific mortgage instrument has been the reverse mortgage. Though interest payments and repayment of principal are deferred, the compounding of interest that causes loans to 'balloon' may be unattractive to older homeowners, particularly those with bequest motives. The life cycle literature, as summarised in, for example, Haffner (2008) , is supportive of this view; it detects a 'resistance' to consume housing equity in old age, with reverse mortgages often regarded as option of last resort. Bequest motives may also play a role. However, to date the evidence is mixed in regard to its importance in decision-making surrounding the use of housing equity in older age (see Olsberg & Winters, 2005) .
On the other hand, there are countries such as the UK and Australia where equity withdrawal among pre-retirement owners has been vibrant, helped along by mortgage product innovations (e.g. second mortgages, line of credit equity conversion loans, current account mortgages). Unlike age-specific products, these MEW products have a normal contract term that is not reliant on sale proceeds to meet principal repayments. The evidence suggest their use to meet pressing spending needs, especially for younger borrowers with growing families, as Wood, Parkinson, Searle, and Smith (2013) find for Australia and the UK.
13
In contrast, there are countries, for example, Germany and Finland in our study, where MEW is uncommon across the life course and suitable mortgage products remain limited. Their unavailability could be due to an absence of demand for MEW instruments. The Netherlands and US mortgage markets seem to have characteristics that place them intermediate between these two extremes. Historically fixed rate mortgages dominate the markets in both countries (Ong et al., 2013b) and this institutional feature of mortgage markets may have favoured refinancing and second mortgages as the vehicle for MEW. Though there has not been the same type of mortgage product innovation (e.g. current account mortgages) witnessed in the UK and Australia, active MEW is apparent in the Netherlands (particularly in the 1990s) and the USA.
In the next section, we dig deeper and examine a variety of market and institutional factors that could offer insights that advance our understanding of these inter-country differences.
Market and institutional contexts
We highlight four market and institutional factors; each one may have a particular resonance for the management of housing equity over the life course. We discuss each factor in turn. Table 2 provides a summary.
Housing tenure and mortgage market development
Homeownership societies supported by large, open mortgage markets featuring competition between specialist housing finance institutions and commercial banks will favour MEW. In these countries most households principal asset will be their home, and if most have borrowed in order to purchase there is likely to be a welldeveloped (mature) mortgage market accompanying the high rates of owner occupation (see Ong et al., 2013a) .
The trend mortgage debt to GDP ratios documented in Section 1 are supportive; we find that Australia, USA and UK have relatively high debt to GDP ratios, and these are the key countries which spawned early development of MEW products (ASIC, 2005) . The Netherlands has an extremely high debt to GDP ratio, and its mortgage market is well developed enough to support a surge in MEW on the back of a spike in house prices during the 1990s (see Section 3). On the other hand, Germany and Finland have relatively low debt to GDP ratios, implying less mature mortgage markets. Indeed, Wicke (2008; see also Reifner et al. 2007a, b) reports that German attempts to launch reverse mortgages have failed because of their complexity and associated legal insecurities.
Arguably, the residential mortgage debt to GDP ratio exhibits but one dimension of mortgage market maturity. Rankings of the six case study countries based on two other proxies of mortgage market maturity are depicted in Table 3 . Chiuri and Jappelli (2010) , drawing on a mortgage market regulation index produced by Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) , claim that mature mortgage markets are regulated in such a way that they can be characterised by variable interest rate loans, a variety Ong et al. (2013a) of MEW options, high loan-to-value mortgages and property valuation at market values. According to these criteria Australia and UK score high on maturity, followed by USA and the Netherlands, and finally Finland and Germany (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2010) . The IMF (2008) uses a mortgage market index based on the structural characteristics of housing finance systems across countries. Broadly speaking, the index is a composite calculated from measures of the extent of MEW, loan-tovalue ratios, typical loan terms, and issues of covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities in each country. The higher the index, the more mature is a country's housing finance sector. The IMF index scores the USA highest in terms of maturity, followed by the Netherlands, Australia and UK. Once again, Finland and Germany are bottom of the list. Overall the three indexes presented in Table 3 confirm that Australia, UK, USA and the Netherlands generally feature relatively mature mortgage markets, while Finland and Germany have less-developed mortgage markets. Equity borrowing is more common in countries with both well-developed mortgage markets as well as high rates of homeownership; and this is especially true if accompanied by deregulated housing finance systems. The English-speaking group of countries (ESGC) in Table 3 (Australia, UK and USA), where MEW is common, all liberalised their mortgage markets 20 À 30 years ago and can be classified as competitive housing finance models which allow for easier access to housing debt based on increased diversity of funding options (IMF, 2008) . They also have relatively high homeownership rates (see Figure 1) .The more closed circuit housing finance systems, typified by Germany and Finland, did not introduce the innovative mortgage products that facilitated MEW in the ESGC, even though Finland has a relatively high homeownership rate of 60%, as shown in Figure 1 . Lowe (2011) argues that those countries with liberalised housing and mortgage markets were quickest to change in response to the flood of global finance that Table 3 . Degree of mortgage market maturity using alternative proxies, six case study countries.
Proxies for mortgage market maturity Degree of mortgage market maturity
Residential mortgage debt to GDP ratio (EMF, 2011; IMF, 2011) Mortgage market index (IMF, 2008) Mortgage market regulation index (Chiuri & Jappelli, 2010) securitisation unleashed. Highly competitive housing finance markets pushed banks, building societies, credits unions and other mortgage providers to offer mortgages on ever more favourable and flexible terms that encouraged borrowers to become highly geared. Our description of mortgage products and innovation in mortgage markets confirms the association with market liberalisation. However, in the countries with fixed rate mortgages (e.g. the Netherlands and USA) flexible mortgage products do not prosper, as lenders must match fixed rate mortgages with retail or wholesale sources of finance that secure an equivalent yield over the fixed rate term. This is impossible with flexible mortgages because it is impossible to predict the outstanding mortgage balance over the fixed rate contract period. Therefore in countries with fixed rate mortgages refinancing (with prepayment penalties) second mortgages are the main vehicles for MEW. At the other extreme, the more closed circuit housing finance systems, typified by Germany and Finland, do not offer the innovative mortgage products that facilitate MEW in the ESGC.
House price appreciation
The housing equity components of owner-occupier wealth portfolios mushroom with rapid house price appreciation. This provides at least two motives prompting MEW; first, it is a potential resource that can be tapped to smooth consumption and buffer income shocks (Smith et al., 2009 ). Second, it can result in portfolio imbalances as housing wealth comes to dominate other assets (Wood et al., 2013 ). Households could then release some of their housing equity in order to finance the acquisition of alternative investments to achieve a more diversified portfolio. From this perspective, mortgage products facilitating MEW emerged in response to a growing clamour from owners wanting to unlock their windfall gains. Different real house price profiles could then offer an explanation for divergent equity borrowing practices. In countries with stagnant or falling real house prices there will simply be no demand for equity borrowing products. Supply of such products may dry up as well, if the risks borne by the lenders are perceived to be excessive. Figure 2 profiles (in our six country case study sample) the growth in real house prices over the 40 years leading up to the GFC. In the equity borrowing countries, Australia, UK and USA, real house prices soared from the mid-1990s through to 2007, but especially so in Australia and the UK. A similar profile can be observed for the Netherlands in the 1990s, where accelerated house price inflation in the latter part of the decade sparked a surge in MEW activities. In Finland there is a more volatile pattern; a sharp upturn in house prices in the late 1980s, is followed by an equally sharp downturn in 1989-1990, before prices settled through the first half of the 1990s at levels below those in the early 1980s. Market conditions then strengthened, house prices recovered, but not as strongly as in Australia and the UK. Germany stands out as the only country in Figure 2 where real house prices have in fact declined since the mid-1990s. These cross country patterns are then generally supportive of the idea that house price inflation encourages MEW. The one possible exception is Finland, which has experienced bouts of strong price growth, but there have been recurrent and sharp price corrections that could have deterred equity borrowing.
Taxation 14
The tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is relevant because it is an important influence on housing assets financial appeal as a vehicle for the accumulation of wealth, as well as a determinant of equity and debt financing decisions. Comprehensive income tax systems should tax the income that is generated by assets, but allow the deduction from taxable income of interest on debt used to acquire income generating assets. It is common for countries to exempt homeowner imputed rents (e.g. Australia, Germany, UK and USA) or leniently tax imputed rents (e.g. Netherlands and Finland).
However, while most of the case study countries in this paper do not allow mortgage interest deduction, the USA stands out as it allows mortgage interest deduction at the taxpayer's marginal rate, despite exempting imputed rents from taxation. The USA therefore stands out as the one country with a taxation treatment of homeowners that is particularly favourable to equity borrowing. These provide strong incentives to add to debt secured against homes, and one might speculate that tax motives were a powerful cause of the wave of re-financing that accompanied strong US house price gains in the lead up to the GFC.
A similar explanation could be the root cause of the Dutch wave of equity borrowing at the end of the 1990s. House prices were rising rapidly, mortgage interest was fully deductible at borrowers' marginal rates of taxes (while imputed rents were valued at below-market levels), and at the time deductions could be claimed regardless of the purpose of the loan.
But in the main, case study governments tightened or removed homeowner tax concessions, so that tax environments have become less favourable to MEW. In the UK mortgage interest deductions were phased out by 2001 (Haffner & De Vries, 2010) . In Germany, mortgage interest deductions were replaced in 1996 by a homeowner grant, which in turn was abolished about ten years later. In 1993 Finland replaced taxation of imputed rents by a municipal tax, retained the deduction of mortgage interest, but against income from capital and against a proportional rate (Haffner, 2002; European Central Bank, 2013) .
In the Netherlands gradual removal of homeowner tax preferences began in 2001 with mortgage interest deductions limited to the main home, and only to that part of the home purchase or renovation that is financed by a mortgage (Haffner & De Vries, 2010) . Deductions are also restricted to a lifetime limitation of 30 years. The first of these measures is particularly relevant because they deter owner borrowers from making use of second mortgages and credit mortgages in order to finance consumption spending, as was the case in the 1990s (see also Toussaint, 2013) . From 2005 onwards, owners continue (in principle) to pay income tax on imputed rents, but assessable imputed rents are capped at a value equal to mortgage interest payments. Once a mortgage is repaid, imputed rents become fully tax exempt, a change from previous tax legislation that deterred repayment because owners became liable to taxation on gross imputed rents once mortgages were paid off. This last reform is an interesting and novel use of tax measures to deter MEW by motivating accelerated repayment of the principal. More recently (1 January 2013) new mortgage loans must now have a conventional amortised repayment schedule with a maximum term of 30 years. This new measure means that line of credit or flexible mortgages are not eligible for the mortgage interest deduction (Haffner, Van den Broeck, & Winters 2014) . Finally, from 2014 onwards, the Dutch government reduced the maximum tax rate at which mortgage interest can be deducted from 52% to 38%, though the reduction is being phased in at 0.5 percentage points per year.
Pension systems
The market for home equity conversion among older homeowners will reflect the demand for home equity conversion products. While bequest motives and the limited earnings prospects of most retirees may deter the take up of reverse mortgages and other age-specific products, there will be a demand from those in acute need, as for many of the elderly, owner-occupied homes are their only significant asset. Pressing spending needs in old age will reflect the coverage and generosity of public pension schemes. Countries with means tests governing eligibility, and retirement pensions that are low relative to earnings when working (low replacement rates) might deter MEW during working lives. Repayment of mortgages by retirement is important because low housing costs are crucial to pensioner living standards when retirement pensions are low. On the other hand MEW in retirement might be encouraged as most wealth is held in housing, and its release can be a critically important buffer to income shocks. In countries with generous universal pension schemes these motives will be weaker.
Australia has an active market in equity conversion, particularly among younger homeowners. It features a means-tested public pension scheme, and relatively low public pension replacement rates of 13.6% (OECD, 2013) . Public pension replacement rates in the Netherlands, UK and USA fall in the intermediate range (29.5%, 32.6% and 38.3% respectively). The public pension replacement rates climb up to 42% in Germany and 54.8% in Finland, indicating that public pension systems are relatively generous in these two countries. Hence, it does not come as a surprise to find that Germany and Finland have relatively undeveloped markets in equity release products, and low levels of MEW activity compared to the other countries reviewed (Reifner, 2007a, b) .
However, in countries with low to intermediate public pension replacement rates, the type and existence of mandatory private pension schemes also contribute to pension income in retirement. In 1992, Australia introduced a mandatory private pension scheme that compels employers to make superannuation guarantee contributions that are a percentage of the employee's salary (Ong et al., 2013a) . In principle, this brings the total mandatory replacement rate up to 52.3%. However, the wealth accumulated in these private pensions cannot be accessed until retirement, and is therefore unavailable to buffer income shocks or smooth consumption during working lives. The guarantee contribution is then equivalent to forced saving; in principle, MEW during working lives is a way of reversing this forced saving, and as retirement approaches it can be employed to (effectively) bring forward pension pay outs.
The Netherlands has a quasi-mandatory private pension system, which increases its total mandatory replacement rate to 90.7% (OECD, 2013) . 15 The strong house price growth in the Netherlands in the 1990s and coincident upsurge in mortgage refinancing, might well reflect the same motives as in Australia. But the correlation with house prices hints at an additional reason; the mandatory pension system forces employees to save for retirement, but if house prices are surging they have two potentially large and growing illiquid assets. In aggregate it becomes increasingly likely that their value exceeds the store of wealth that people would voluntarily accumulate for retirement, and the pressure to find ways to unlock excess wealth increases as the upswing of the house price cycle gathers speed. Those countries with mandatory private pension systems and a history of periods of strong house price growth, as in Australia and Netherlands, do indeed have an active equity borrowing market, and in the Netherlands at least, the pre-retirement age group (50À64 years) have been the most active participants (see Toussaint, 2013, p. 214) .
In the UK and the USA where MEW markets are also relatively active, public pensions are not complemented by mandatory private pensions. In Finland and Germany, where MEW markets are relatively undeveloped, mandatory private pension schemes also do not exist (OECD, 2013) . However, these two countries have generous public pension schemes relative to the other case study countries.
Discussion and conclusions
There are a number of generalisations that we might draw in regard to the influence of market and institutional settings on the propensity to use MEW. 16 First, in countries with buoyant MEW markets (Australia, UK, USA and Netherlands) there have been lengthy periods of strong real house price growth, mortgage markets are relatively open and liberalised, and tax regimes have offered generous concessions to homeowners. Within this group of countries there are some idiosyncrasies that have a bearing on the strength of MEW. While open and liberalised mortgage markets appear to be a catalyst for product innovation, the types of MEW products differ across the four countries. Fixed rate mortgages have been the typical mortgage product in the Netherlands and USA; as a consequence re-financing and second mortgages have been the common equity borrowing vehicle. In variable rate countries À Australia and the UK À flexible mortgages such as the current account mortgage are the principal equity borrowing mechanism. The flexible mortgage is a less costly instrument to use, and might offer the better longer term prospects for enduring MEW.
Comparisons with Finland and Germany suggest that other factors are at play as well. For example, relatively high Finnish and German public pension replacement rates may help explain the lack of MEW in these countries. Also, mortgage markets in these countries are less well developed, as indicated by low mortgage debt to GDP ratios and closed housing finance circuits that are not inclined to innovate with regard to mortgage products. Furthermore, house price appreciation has not been as conducive to MEW activity, particularly in Germany where real house prices have been trending down in the new millennium. The presence or otherwise of mandatory contributions to private pensions is another distinguishing characteristic. It marks out the Netherlands and Australia from the rest (OECD, 2013) . Mandatory contributions are a form of forced saving; in periods of strong house price growth the incentive 'to MEW' becomes particularly acute in those countries.
While tax concessions have been linked with MEW, it is the type of concession that matters. The deduction for mortgage interest payments is especially important because the after-tax cost of debt finance is reduced by this provision. By extending this tax preference to all debt secured against housing, regardless of purpose, countries encourage equity borrowing. By restricting interest deductions to mortgage debt financing purchase of a principal residence or its renovation, the Netherlands has addressed this incentive effect, and there are signs of a slowing in MEW since these tax reforms were introduced.
Even though MEW activity is strong in Australia, the UK and USA, and was strong at the end of the 1990s in the Netherlands, transactions in housing equity seem to have been largely the preserve of pre-retirement age cohorts. There are mortgage products specifically designed to appeal to retired homeowners, but they have remained a small segment of the mortgage market, even when (as in the USA) government backs the product with a guarantee.
What might be wider implications for public policy and Western welfare systems? A key issue is whether the primary home can continue to serve as a cornerstone of the welfare system by smoothing consumption in retirement. Outright ownership in old age means that lower incomes in retirement are matched by lower housing costs, and retirees can maintain consumption on smaller pensions (Castles, 1998; Baxter & McDonald, 2005) . But in Australia, USA and UK owner-occupied housing equity is or has increasingly been used to smooth consumption earlier in the life course, as owners MEW using the flexible mortgage products promoted by liberalised housing finance markets. The result may be a growing number of middle-aged homeowners that are approaching retirement with outstanding mortgage debt. These developments threaten the assumption that owner-occupied housing guarantees a secure and satisfactory standard of living in retirement. If the threat becomes real, governments may need to review unregulated housing finance systems, as seems to be the case already in the Netherlands.
However, this scenario is predicated on the assumption that in the absence of information asymmetries, homeowners will apply rational decision-making to maximise their economic welfare. Recent studies by Doling and Elsinga (2013) and Fox O'Mahony and Overton (2014) have noted that there is an emotional dimension attached to homeownership which is related to feelings of financial and ontological security. These feelings often influence individuals' perceptions of the meanings of the home, which in turn play a key role in the decision to release housing equity from the owner-occupied dwelling (Fox O'Mahony & Overton, 2014) . Ong et al. (2013a) provided evidence from Australia showing that the incidence of MEW is significantly lower among the elderly aged 65C years than the baby boomer cohort. Rowlingson and McKay (2005) observe that we still do not know whether the current elderly population's reluctance to exploit equity release products is a cohortspecific or age-specific phenomenon. If it is cohort-specific, then the policy scenario alluded to in the previous paragraph is a real possibility that policymakers need to account for. If it is age-specific, then feelings of security attached to the accumulation of wealth in the primary home in old age will likely discourage moves to draw down on housing wealth in later life (Fox O'Mahony & Overton, 2014) . Overall, both cohort-and age-specific perceptions of the meaning of the home, as well as changing attitudes towards MEW, will mediate any influence that the institutional context has on homeowners' willingness to engage in MEW as they age.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
gage.html> and Santander http://www.santander.co.uk/uk/mortgages/type-of-santander-mort gages; last accessed on 28 October 2014. 8. There can be tax advantages. The interest that would have accrued on a traditional savings bank account must be reported as taxable income. The reduction in interest payments on offset mortgage accounts is not taxable income. 9. Examples include Bankwest, Macquarie Bank and Commonwealth Bank. Refer to http:// www.infochoice.com.au/home-loans/reverse-mortgage/interest-rates/; last accessed on 28 October 2014. 10. Mature age workers, especially the less educated are more vulnerable to job loss, and more likely to leave the workforce when an economic crisis hits near retirement (Coile & Levine, 2011) and/or have difficulty regaining employment after a period of job loss (Weller, 2007) . 11. For more details on a line of credit product, refer to <https://www.ing.nl/particulier/ hypotheken/hypotheekvormen/krediethypotheek/index.html>; last accessed on 12 October 2014. In contrast, the majority of mortgage loans outstanding in the Netherlands typically have interest rates that remain fixed for five to ten years (Van Leeuwen & Bokeloh, 2012) . 12. For more details, refer to: http://rp.nb.se/personalCcustomers/loans/buyingCaChome/ homeflex/1019842.html; last accessed on 30 October 2014. 13. Using Dutch National Bank Household Survey, Ebner (2013; see also Van den End et al., 2002) finds that most MEW is reinvested back into housing. This most likely reflects tax arrangements at the time of the study that permit mortgage interest deduction provided it finances a dwelling, or the renovation of a dwelling. 14. Except for the income tax aspects mentioned here, other tax rules can also deter or incentivise MEW. For example, the tax rules that apply to capital sums obtained as a result of taking out a reverse mortgage or trading on are relevant (Reifner et al., 2007a) . 15. In 2008 there were 656 pension funds under the quasi-mandatory pension scheme covering more than 95% of the workforce (Trampusch et al., 2010) . 16. However, while there are clear associations in our case study countries between institutional differences and MEW, it is conceivable that unmeasured cultural or other differences exist that might also be responsible for the evolution of MEW in each country.
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